There is a website called defensibleborders.org that has a post by Maj.-Gen (res.) Yaakov Amidror describing defensible borders for Israel--what they are and why they are what they are. The post is rather long, and the above link will get you there. I will try to summarize, but the original is better and also has maps.
The article points out:
"Israel's struggle for "defensible borders" is unique in international diplomacy. It emanates from both the special legal and strategic circumstances that Israel faced in the aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day War, when the Israel Defense Forces captured the West Bank and other territories in a war of self-defense. The previous armistice line of 1949 that separated the Israeli and Jordanian armies was only a military boundary and not a permanent political border, according to the armistice agreement itself. The Jordanian occupation of the West Bank occurred in conjunction with its illegal invasion of the State of Israel in 1948. In fact, Jordanian sovereignty in the West Bank was not recognized by a single Arab state. This provided the background for UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967 which concluded that Israel would need "secure and recognized boundaries" that would necessarily be different from the 1967 lines. The previous status quo was not to be restored. In diplomatic shorthand, President George W. Bush stated on April 14, 2004, that Israel had a right to "defensible borders," in order to convey the same point."
The bold type in the above quote from the article is mine--it is not in the original article.
The article further points out:
"According to the principles of defense adopted by armies all over the world, there are three basic criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a defensive plan:
1. A battle space with the necessary depth, so that suitable defensive forces can be deployed in stages.
2. A reserve force of a sufficient level of strength to counterattack in order to restore the situation to what it was prior to the outbreak of hostilities.
3. A suitable distance from the strategic interior, predicated on the assumption that its conquest or serious damage could undermine the army's ability to hold firm.
All of these principles presuppose one cardinal assumption about the conduct of wars:
Since no defensive system will remain the same as it was at the beginning of an attack - and must break apart - there is a necessity for sufficient depth for the reserve forces to mass and there is a need for adequate space before enemy forces reach the strategic interior of a state.
Since the 1967 lines do not meet a single one of these criteria for establishing an adequate defensive plan, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that these cannot be said to constitute defensible or secure borders. The 1967 lines may have certain other advantages from a non-military perspective; some might even think, as a result, that they are good lines. But from a professional military standpoint, relying on the 1967 lines to defend the State of Israel entails an enormous risk, because an army that is deployed along them will not be able to guarantee Israel's defense, should there be a war in the future."
This should be rather obvious to anyone paying attention, but for whatever reason, many countries of the world are choosing to look the other way rather than to apply these principles to Israel.
The world is now at a fork in the road. Do we ignore the threat to Israel as we ignored Kristallnacht in November 1938, and push forward a bogus peace agreement that guarantees a second Holocaust? In September, the United Nations will take a vote to answer that question. Which side will the United States be on?
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